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The Constitutional Right to Assistance in Addition to
Counsel in a Death Penalty Case

I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of whether an indigent criminal defendant has a right
to assistance in addition to counsel was before the United States
Supreme Court more than thirty years ago in United States ex rel.
Smith v. Baldi' in the context of an insanity defense. Although the
court, in dictum, found no constitutional mandate which required
a state to appoint a psychiatrist for a pretrial examination,2 it is
now generally recognized that a court must afford a criminal defendant at least one pre-trial psychiatric examination where insanity
is seriously at issue.3
1. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
2. Id. at 568. The trial court had appointed a psychiatrist to examine Smith and testify at a sanity hearing, but Smith had requested a second examination and opinion by an
expert of his choice at public expense. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d
540, 547 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
3. Since the writing of this comment, the United States Supreme Court has clarified
the right to psychiatric testimony where insanity is raised as a possible defense or where
"future dangerousness" is at issue in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. See Ake v.
Oklahoma, 53 U.S.L.W. 4179 (U.S. February 26, 1985) (No. 83-5424). The Court's holding in
Ake did not affect the primary issue focused upon in this comment. See also note 110.
The leading case on the issue of psychiatric assistance, before Ake, was Bush v. Texas, 372
U.S. 586 (1963). In Bush, the constitutional question was rendered moot when the state,
three days before oral argument, filed a supplemental brief, which included a diagnostic
summary of Bush's mental condition, and at oral argument informed the Court that if the
case were remanded, a full psychiatric examination would be granted. Two years later this
case was back in federal court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in no uncertain terms that Bush's writ would be granted
unless he was retried within a reasonable time and unless he was provided adequate psychiatric assistance at state expense for the retrial. Bush v. McCollum, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.
1965), affg 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964). Cf. Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979) (trial court did not have a reasonable ground to
doubt defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, thus psychiatric examination was not
constitutionally required); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1971) (trial
court cannot refuse request for an examination by psychiatrist who could testify as expert
witness for defense without first conducting an ex parte proceeding required by statute).
If the defendant presents no evidence of insanity prior to requesting the appointment of a
psychiatrist, a court may deny his request without incurring constitutional error. See, e.g.,
Dutton v. State, 434 So.2d 853, 856 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). For a general discussion of the
earlier cases, see Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1056
(1963).
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This comment, however, concerns the need for and right to assistance of experts and other investigative services in contexts other
than the insanity defense, and where the state is seeking the death
penalty." This expectation of a right is founded on the pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois'
that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has." His claim of right
was reinforced by the plurality opinion of Justice Douglas in
Furman v. Georgia,6 which emphasized that a law limiting a death
penalty to those who make less than $3,000, while exempting those
who make more than $50,000 "would plainly fail." As Justice
Douglas noted, "A law which in the overall view reaches that result
in practice has no more sanctity than a law which in terms pro'7
vides the same."

The need for and right to assistance in addition to counsel are
also premised on the constitutional requirement set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio,8 whereby a sentencer in a death penalty case may not be precluded from considering any aspect of the defendant's character or record as a mitigating factor.' Subsequently, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,10 the Court
clarified the rule set forth in Lockett and emphasized that not only
4. Although the principles of equality of justice are applicable to trials in which capital punishment is not a potential penalty, the constitutional arguments are stronger in capital cases because of the need to present experts in support of mitigating circumstances, see
infra note 96 and accompanying text, and because the death penalty is "qualitatively different" from all other penalties. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). See also
infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
5. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). In Griffin the Court held that indigent criminal defendants
were to be afforded appellate review on an equal footing with defendants who had enough
money to buy transcripts. Id.
6. 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Furman a five
justice majority of the United States Supreme Court issued per curiam orders invalidating
existing death penalty statutes, grounded in part on arbitrariness and discrimination in application. Each of the five justices wrote his own opinion. 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id.at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310
(White, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally Ledewitz, The
Requirement of Death: Mandatory Language in the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute,
21 DuQ. L. REV. 103, 115-17 (1982) (each of the justices appeared to mean something quite
different in their use of the terms).
7. 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
8. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
9. Id. at 604. The Ohio statute required a sentence of death once an aggravating circumstance was proved unless one of three mitigating circumstances was also proved. Id. at
593-94. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1)-(3) (Page 1975). See Ledewitz, supra note 6,
at 128-33.
10. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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may evidence in mitigation not be precluded by statutory law, but
the sentencer is required, as a matter of affirmative law, to consider the mitigating circumstances established by the defendant.1
This comment will focus on the need for and right to assistance
in addition to counsel if an indigent capital defendant is not to be
precluded, either directly or indirectly, from presenting his evidence in mitigation. States which provide for ancillary defense services by law" will be compared with Pennsylvania, where the grant
or denial of support services depends entirely upon the sound discretion of the court." It will be shown that while a statutory provision does not insure the presentation of all evidence in mitigation,
the sentence of life in prison or of death may vary significantly,
depending on where the crime happened to be committed and on
how effective counsel can be without such assistance. This comment will also ask, but not answer, why the denial of support services in many of these cases is not a violation of constitutional
guarantees of equal protection, due process, and effective assistance of counsel.
II.
A.

Do

STATUTES REALLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

The Statutory Approach: Arizona, California and North
Carolina

The state of Arizona provides by law that when a person is
charged with a capital offense, the court may appoint investigators
and experts as are reasonably necessary to prepare an adequate
defense.1 4 The amount of compensation granted for such services is
11. 455 U.S. at 112-13. Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion pointed out that
"this court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be
executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the
sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Id. at 117-18
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Eddings had entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of
first degree murder, but was denied funds to hire an investigator and a psychiatrist. Eddings
v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1164-65 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded, 455
U.S. 104 (1982). Although this issue was not discussed by the United States Supreme Court,
it is relevant that Eddings in fact presented testimony by a psychiatrist, a psychologist and
a sociologist. Id.
12. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1978); infra notes 14-28 and accompanying text; CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West Supp. 1984); infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(b) (1981); infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
14. Section 13-4013(B) of the Arizona Code provides as follows:
When a person is charged with a capital offense the court may on its own initiative
and shall upon application of the defendant and a showing that the defendant is
financially unable to pay for such services, appoint such investigators and expert wit-
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determined by the trial court in its discretion.1 5 In practice, however, states such as Arizona hover just above the pure judicial discretion approach.16
The leading case interpreting Arizona's enabling legislation is
State v. Knapp.1 7 Knapp was charged with the killing by arson of
his two small children.1 8 An arson expert had been appointed by
the court pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute section 131673(B), 9 but the court refused a later request for additional
money to recreate the children's bedroom so that the expert's testimony would be admissible at trial.20 In affirming the trial court's
ruling, the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed whether denial in this
particular case violated the due process clause of the United States
Constitution.1 The court distinguished Bowen v. Eyman,2 where
the refusal to fund a potentially exonerative blood test was held to
be a denial of due process. 23 Without further analysis, the court
nesses as are reasonably necessary adequately to present his defense at trial and at
any subsequent proceeding. Compensation for such investigators and expert witnesses
shall be such amount as the court in its discretion deems reasonable and shall be paid
by the county.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1978).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1984) (compensation of counsel includes reimbursement of actual expenses). Rulings by the Mississippi courts are remarkably
similar to those issued in Arizona. See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 443 So.2d 806, 812 (Miss.
1983), where the court granted a motion providing Caldwell with a psychiatric expert, but
refused to provide him with the assistance of either an investigator or a ballistics expert.
See also GA. CODE § 17-12-60 (1980) (reimbursement in capital cases of such sums as have
been actually and prudently incurred, not to exceed $500.00).
17. 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
18. 114 Ariz. at 533-34, 562 P.2d at 706-07. Knapp was convicted by a jury on two
counts of murder in the first degree on November 19, 1974 and sentenced to death on both
counts by the trial judge on January 6, 1975. Id.
19. Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1673 (renumbered as § 13-4013 by 1977 ARIz. SEss.
LAWS 142, § 158). 114 Ariz. at 539, 562 P.2d at 712.
20. 114 Ariz. at 539-41, 562 P.2d at 712-14. At an earlier trial held on these charges,
the state had objected to the previous experiments on the ground that they did not meet the
evidentiary requirement of substantially similar conditions. Id. at 539, 562 P.2d at 712.
21. Id. at 539-40, 562 P.2d at 712-13. The court stated that substantial prejudice to
the defendant must be demonstrated before the denial or restriction of investigative funds
will constitute a denial of due process. Id. at 540, 562 P.2d at 713 (citing Mason v. Arizona,
504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975)). In Mason the petitioner was denied investigative assistance on the grounds that he failed to demonstrate sufficient need, despite his having informed the court that twenty-three witnesses were listed by
the prosecutor and that many of them were from out of state. 504 F.2d at 1352.
22. 324 F. Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 1970).
23. 114 Ariz. at 540, 562 P.2d at 713. The Knapp court agreed that "fundamental
fairness is the touchstone i.e. whether or not a defendant is entitled to a court-appointed
expert depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.
... Id. (quoting Bowen, 324
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adopted the federal standard under the Criminal Justice Act 2 4 for

vacating a conviction and judgment of sentence when a motion for
funds for ancillary defense services is denied. 5 Federal law, acproof of substantial prejudice
cording to the Knapp court, requires
26
by clear and convincing evidence.

The court then concluded that since the statute does not mandate an appointment of investigators or experts merely upon application by the defendant, it was within the discretion of the trial
court, limited only by constitutional principles, to grant or deny a
defendant's request.2 7 In subsequent cases, the Arizona Supreme

Court has consistently applied the Knapp analysis and appears not
to have overruled a trial court's decision to deny a defense motion
for experts or investigators."
In contrast to Arizona, California rigorously upholds the criminal defendant's constitutional and statutory right to ancillary deF. Supp. at 340).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1984). Subsection (e) provides:
(e) Services other than counsel
(1) Upon Request. - Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them
in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte
proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable
to obtain them, the court, or the United States magistrate if the services are required
in connection with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to
obtain the services.
(2) Without prior request. -Counsel appointed under this section may obtain, subject to later review, investigative, expert, or other services without prior authorization
if necessary for an adequate defense. The total cost of services obtained without prior
authorization may not exceed $150 and expenses reasonably incurred.
(3) Maximum Amounts. - Compensation to be paid to a person for services rendered by him to a person under this subsection, or to be paid to an organization for
services rendered by an employee thereof, shall not exceed $300, exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred, unless payment in excess of that limit is
certified by the court, or by the United States magistrate if the services were rendered in connection with a case disposed of entirely before him, as necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration, and the
amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit.
Id. The Criminal Justice Act is not limited to capital cases. For a general discussion of the
high expectations which accompanied passage of the Act, see Comment, Assistance In Addition To Counsel For Indigent Defendants: The Need For; The Lack Of; The Right To, 16
VILL. L. REV. 323, 331-35 (1970).
25. 114 Ariz. at 540, 562 P.2d at 713. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. 114 Ariz. at 540, 562 P.2d at 713.
27. Id. The court made no independent analysis of the Arizona statute or the intent of
the legislature in providing for "reasonably necessary" services. Id.
28. See, e.g., State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 624 P.2d 828, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
882 (1981); State v. Gretzler, 126 Ariz. 60, 612 P.2d 1023 (1980).
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fense services.29 The recognition of such rights is most apparent in
those cases in which the prosecutor is seeking the death penalty. 30
In 1977, the state legislature enacted special legislation requiring
the state to fund reasonably necessary defense services in capital
cases.3 1 Although the terminology used by the legislature in the
California enactment 32 is substantially similar to the Arizona statute previously discussed,1 3 the courts of California have interpreted the California law more expansively. 4
In Sand v. Superior Court,35 the California Supreme Court, unlike the Arizona courts, 36 focused on the legislative intent in order
to interpret the enabling legislation. By enacting the legislation, it
was clear to the majority in Sand that the legislature had established a broad base for funding defense services in capital cases
because of its acknowledged recognition and belief that preparing
for a murder trial is inherently more difficult than preparing for a
trial on a lesser3 7offense and also because of the severity of the potential penalty.
29. See Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 628 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr. 165
(1984) and cases cited therein. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West Supp. 1984). The enabling legislation was conditioned upon passage of the 1977 death penalty law and was intended to remedy one of the
constitutional infirmities found in the pre-existing law. Sand v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d
567, 571, 668 P.2d 787, 790, 194 Cal. Rptr. 480, 483 (1983). See also Keenan v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 3d 243, 249 n.8, 640 P.2d 108, 111 n.8, 180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 492 n.8, appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 937 (1982).
32. Section 987.9 provides in pertinent part:
In the trial of a capital case the indigent defendant, through his counsel, may request
the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for
the preparation or presentation of the defense. The application for funds shall be by
affidavit and shall specify that the funds are reasonably necessary for the preparation
or presentation of the defense. The fact that an application has been made shall be
confidential and the contents of the application shall be confidential. Upon receipt of
an application, a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the
capital case in question, shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall
disburse an appropriate amount of money to defendant's attorney. The ruling on the
reasonableness of the request shall be made at an in camera hearing. In making the
ruling, the court shall be guided by the need to provide a complete and full defense
for the defendant.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West Supp. 1984).
33. See supra note 14.
34. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
35. 34 Cal. 3d 567, 668 P.2d 787, 194 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1983).
36. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
37. 34 Cal. 3d at 575, 668 P.2d at 792, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 485. On the other hand,
according to Chief Justice Bird, the legislature intended to make the benefits of the statute
equally available to individuals charged with murder whenever special circumstances were
alleged. Id. at 576, 668 P.2d at 793, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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In Sand, the defendant had been charged with committing a
homicide while in prison serving a life sentence for a prior murder. 8 Sand was granted monies pursuant to section 987.9 of the
California Penal Code and had hired an investigator, two experts
in the field of prison environment, and jury selection consultants.3 9
His first trial was declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to
reach a verdict.40 After the prosecutor had announced that the
state would not seek the death penalty on retrial, Sand was denied
any additional funding for trial preparation." In response, Sand
sought a writ of mandate from the California Supreme Court compelling the grant of section 987.9 funds even though the potential
penalty was life without parole.42 The Sand court recognized the
constitutional and statutory right to defense services in all cases,
but noted that the legislature had intentionally provided for state
funding in capital cases only.43 Quoting Keenan v. Superior
Court,44 the Sand court emphasized the qualitative difference
when the penalty may be death and reaffirmed that "courts must
be particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard designed to
'' 45
guarantee [a] defendant a full defense be observed.

The query in Keenan had centered around the right to the assistance of co-counsel in capital cases."' The trial court was held to
have abused its discretion in denying Keenan's motion, but the
statutory authority for such appointment was found in section
47
987(b) of the California Penal Code, rather than section 987.9.

38. 34 Cal. 3d at 569, 668 P.2d at 788, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 34 Cal. 3d at 569, 668 P.2d at 788-89, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
42. Id. at 569, 668 P.2d at 788, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
43. Id. at 575, 668 P.2d at 792, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86. The court explained that
county funds were available in all other cases pursuant to § 987.8(f)(1) of the California
Penal Code. Id. at 575 n.3, 688 P.2d at 792 n.3, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 486 n.3.
44. 31 Cal. 3d 243, 640 P.2d 108, 180 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1982).
45. 34 Cal. 3d at 53, 668 P.2d at 791, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (quoting Keenan v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d at 430, 640 P.2d at 111, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 492). The Sand court also
relied on the United States Supreme Court pronouncements in Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976), in reaching its decision. 34 Cal. 3d at 572, 668 P.2d at 790, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 483-84.
46. 31 Cal. 3d at 245, 640 P.2d at 109, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Keenan had previously
been granted $23,000 pursuant to section 987.9 to obtain investigative and expert services.
Id. at 247 & n.6, 640 P.2d at 110 & n.6, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 491 & n.6.
47. Id. at 248-49, 640 P.2d at 111, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 492. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987(b)
(West Supp. 1984). The court in Keenan cited People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d
149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981), for the proposition that
principles of equal protection do not compel appointment of second counsel and for its ruling that the grant or denial of such a request is within the sound discretion of the trial
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The underlying rationale for granting the motion, however, remained the same: "in striking a balance between the interests of
the state and those of the defendant, it is generally necessary to
protect more carefully the rights of a defendant who is charged
with a capital crime."4
Although the California Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the fundamental and qualitative differences between death
and other penalties, not every request by counsel for statutorily
authorized funds is granted.4 Nor is counsel deemed to be ineffective per se if he fails to request such funds.5 0 Still, the enabling
legislation enacted in California has had a significant impact on
the quality of defense services afforded the indigent criminal defendant, primarily because the judiciary is carrying out the spirit
and intent of the law. 51 The California Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that the decision to grant or deny defense motions for financial assistance is a question solely for the judiciary,
and that an indigent's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel will not be denied on the basis of how much money he
52
has.
Whereas the California Supreme Court has instructed its trial
courts to view requests for pre-trial assistance liberally, 53 in North
court, but this court disagreed with the Jackson court's citing of section 987.9 as authority
for such discretion. 31 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 640 P.2d at 110-11, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
48. 31 Cal. 3d at 250, 640 P.2d at 111-12, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (citing Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
49. In Lucero v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 484, 176 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1981), the
court of appeals found no abuse of discretion where the trial court had denied a defense
request for $23,000 in order to conduct a survey on whether pretrial publicity required a
change of venue. The court, however, limited its findings to the facts presented in this case,
but did not foreclose the allocation of statutory funds for a similar survey upon an adequate
showing of reasonable necessity. Id. at 489-90, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
50. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603
(1980). Cf. People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979) (counsel ineffective for failing to seek psychiatric or expert advice where potential diminished
capacity defense exists).
51. Cf. State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437 (1981) (no indication that a
jury selection expert would have enabled defendant's counsel to conduct a better voir dire of
jury panel), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982). See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
52. The strength of the court's ability to enforce this particular constitutional right is
exemplified in Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr.
165 (1984). In Corenevsky the court reviewed the trial court's decision to grant $8,740, pursuant to section 987.9, for a jury selection expert, and to deny county funding for two law
clerks to assist defense counsel. The granting of funds was affirmed, but the denial of the
latter request was held to be in error. In addition, the county auditor was found to be in
contempt of court for refusing to disburse the court-ordered payment. Id.
682 P.2d at 367, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 172. The court in Corenevsky recog53. Id. at -,
nized that "because of the early stage at which the request typically arises, it will often be
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Carolina the supreme court has directed the lower courts to use
caution in granting requests which require the expenditure of public funds. 4 In North Carolina the trial court is to require a clear
showing by the defendant that specific evidence is reasonably
available, that the appointment is necessary for a proper defense,
and that without such help, the defendant will not receive a fair
trial.5 5 No distinction is made between capital and non-capital
cases.

56

State v. Tatum 7 was the first North Carolina case in which the
state supreme court addressed the statutory and constitutional issues involved in the grant or denial of defense motions for experts
or other assistance. The court questioned whether the holding in
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi58 remained viable in light of
subsequent decisions by the United States Supreme Court, which
have required that states provide indigent defendants with the basic tools necessary to prepare an adequate defense.5 9 After observing that the United States Supreme Court had not reconsidered its
decision in Baldi, the Tatum court concluded that it would "adhere to the holding in that decision." 0
The court next considered whether the denial of funds to hire a
difficult for counsel to demonstrate a clear need for such funds." Id.
54. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 405, 284 S.E.2d 437, 445 (1981) (quoting
State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 82, 229 S.E.2d 562, 567-68 (1976)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932
(1982).
55. Id. See generally Note, Criminal Procedure - An Indigent's ConstitutionalRight
to a State-Paid Expert, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1031, 1041 (1980) ("standard to be applied
is whether a 'reasonable likelihood' exists that the expert will materially assist the defendant in the preparation of his defense or that without such help it is probable that the
defendant will not receive a fair trial").
56. Compare State v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634, 304 S.E.2d 184 (1983) (capital case) with
State v. Watson, 310 N.C. 384, 312 S.E.2d 448 (1984) (trial judge ruled prior to trial that
this would be a non-capital first degree murder case).
57. 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976). Tatum was convicted by a jury of murder in
the first degree, kidnapping and armed robbery, and was sentenced to death. The North
Carolina death penalty statute was subsequently invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). A sentence of life imprisonment
was then imposed in lieu of the death penalty. 291 N.C. at 90, 229 S.E.2d at 572.
58. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
59. 291 N.C. at 80-82, 229 S.E.2d at 566-67. Although Baldi had argued that "the assistance of a psychiatrist was necessary to afford him adequate counsel," the Court did not
have to reach this issue, since Baldi had not been completely denied such assistance. The
later cases cited in Tatum were: Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971); Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
60. 291 N.C. at 81, 229 S.E.2d at 567. In Baldi three psychiatrists, one of whom was
court appointed, testified at trial. 344 U.S. at 568. See also Note, Criminal Procedure ProvidingIndigent Criminal Defendants State-PaidInvestigators, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
655, 663 (1977).
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private investigator violated either the equal protection or due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment." The court reasoned
that the state had not imposed a barrier to the preparation of
Tatum's defense, but was merely denying him an additional tool
available to wealthier defendants.2 The argument that the services
of an investigator are also available in public defender cases was
similarly rejected by the court, which considered the discretionary
use of such assistance as functionally equivalent to the discretion
granted by law to the trial judge. 3 In deciding the ,due process
question, the Tatum court merely adopted the language used in
State v. Taylor" by the Kansas Supreme Court.65 Essentially, the
Kansas court had recognized the inherent authority of the courts,
in the absence of a statute, to provide expert witnesses where due
process so demanded.6 6 The Tatum court then concluded that the
General Assembly of North Carolina had intended to grant its
courts similar discretion, and that a trial judge may decide whether
to provide expert assistance based on the facts and circumstances
7
of each case.
By interpreting the North Carolina statute as merely granting
the judiciary discretionary authority which, in practice, it already
61. 291 N.C. at 81-84, 229 S.E.2d at 567-69.
62. Id. Tatum had cited Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), as support for his argument, but the North Carolina Supreme Court rebutted by citing Griffin for the proposition
that "a State need not equalize economic conditions." 291 N.C. at 83, 229 S.E.2d at 568.
63. 291 N.C. at 84, 229 S.E.2d at 568. The General Assembly of North Carolina had
enacted two statutory provisions applicable to the present issue. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(b)
(1981) states as follows:
Whenever a person, under the standards and procedures set out in this subchapter, is
determined to be an indigent person entitled to counsel, it is the responsibility of the
State to provide him with counsel and the other necessary expenses of representation.
The professional relationship of counsel so provided to the indigent person he represents is the same as if counsel had been privately retained by the indigent person.
Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. 7A-454 (1981) specifically provides for "supporting services":
The court, in its discretion, may approve a fee for the services of an expert witness
who testifies for an indigent person, and shall approve reimbursement for the necessary expenses of counsel. Fees and expenses accrued under this section shall be paid
by the State.
Id. The statutory provisions played a minor role in the court's analysis. See infra note 68
and accompanying text.
64. 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968).
65. 291 N.C. at 81, 229 S.E.2d at 567. "We find the language in State v. Taylor, supra
particularly persuasive." Id.
66. 202 Kan. at 204-05, 447 P.2d at 809.
67. 291 N.C. at 81-82, 229 S.E.2d at 567-68. The court found the language in the statute to be consistent with Kansas' judicial discretion approach. Id. at 82, 229 S.E.2d at 567.
The trial court is cautioned, however, not to "saddle the state with needless expense." Id. at
82, 229 S.E.2d at 568.
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possessed, the Tatum court failed to give any weight to the purpose or intent of the General Assembly in enacting the statute.6 8
Following the Tatum decision in 1976, appellants have continued
to argue that their requests for ancillary defense services are being
denied in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights.6 " In
response, the North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly
quoted Tatum without questioning the cases' rationale. 7 ° The
court continues to require that the defendant prove what an investigator or expert would find without first providing the assistance. 71 This places a difficult burden on the defendant before he
can prove an abuse of discretion.7
From the North Carolina experience it appears that a statutory
enactment may be worthless absent enforcement and enlightened
application; nevertheless, states possessing such laws may at least
have the potential to provide public funds to criminal defendants
68. Cf. Sand v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 567, 668 P.2d 787, 194 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1983).
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 310 N.C. 384, 312 S.E.2d 448 (1984) (survey on extent of
pretrial publicity); State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983) (jury selection expert); State v. Sandlin, 61 N.C. App. 421, 300 S.E.2d 893 (investigator and expert witnesses),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243 (1982)
(statistician); State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437 (1981) (additional counsel,
research assistant, statistician, jury selection expert), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982);
State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 277 S.E.2d 410 (1981) (investigator).
70. See supra note 69.
71. In Sandlin the defendant had pointed out that the state used twenty-six different
witnesses, some of whom had lived out of state, that the state did not use other witnesses
who had been interviewed by the police, and that the state had presented four of their own
expert witnesses. 61 N.C. App. at 421, 300 S.E.2d at 897. Despite this evidence, the court of
appeals ruled that the defendant had made "no showing that any evidence other than that
presented at trial was reasonably available or that [an investigator] would have assisted in
preparation of a defense." Id.
In State v. Williams the trial judge had refused to submit to the jury the defendant's use
of alcohol on the night of the crime as a mitigating circumstance. 305 N.C. at 687, 292
S.E.2d at 262. One of the reasons given by the North Carolina Supreme Court for affirming
the trial court's ruling was the lack of expert psychiatric testimony to show that alcohol had
impaired his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Id.
72. In Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1980), the court of appeals
found that a denial of expert assistance could result in a denial of equal protection, effective
assistance of counsel and due process of law in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. The trial judge had acknowledged the defendant's need for assistance, but he believed that he lacked the authority to furnish a forensic pathologist at state expense. Id. at
1026. Therefore, the denial of the defendant's motion, according to the court of appeals, had
not been the result of informed discretion. Id. The remedy in this case, however, was to
remand for the appointment of a pathologist to assist Williams in establishing that the expert would have been necessary to prepare an adequate defense. If he made the required
showing, then the writ of habeas corpus would be granted, subject to retrial. Id. at 1027. For
a full discussion of Williams v. Martin see Note, supra note 55, passim.
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in contrast to states without any legislation on point.
B.

The Judicial Discretion Approach: Pennsylvania

In stark contrast to states like Arizona and California, 73 Pennsylvania possesses no statute providing for assistance in addition to
counsel, the state legislature having repealed its enabling legislation in 1978. 4 Significantly, this was the same year that the state
reenacted its current death penalty statute. 75 Prior to 1978, an indigent defendant accused of murder could petition the court for a
rule to show cause why an investigator or expert should not be appointed to assist in his defense.7 6 In Commonwealth v. Phelan7 7
application of the statute was interpreted as discretionary with the
trial court, as long as the court's denial did not also result in a
denial of the petitioner's constitutional guarantee of effective rep78
resentation by counsel.
There is currently no statutory mandate in Pennsylvania specifically authorizing payment for the services of an expert or investigator to assist in the defense of an indigent criminal defendant,
regardless of the nature of the crime charged or the penalty
73. See supra note 14 & 32 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
18.85.100 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (Law Co-op. 1983); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 26.05 (West. 1984). Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (experts provided only in capital cases, but compensation may not exceed $250.00 per
defendant).
74. Act of March 22, 1907, Pub. L. No. 31, § 1, 19 PA. STAT. ANN. § 784 (as amended),
repealed by Judiciary Repealer Act of April 28, 1978, No. 53, § 2a[895], 1978 Pa. Laws 202
(current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 20002(a)[895] (1982).
75. Act of Sept. 13, 1978, No. 141, § 1, 1978 Pa. Laws 756 (current version at 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1982)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated the 1974 Pennsylvania Death Penalty statute because of the limitations on mitigating circumstances imposed
by the legislature. See Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382 A.2d 442 (1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
76. See supra note 2. Section 784 of title 19 required a hearing on the petition during
which counsel was to produce satisfactory evidence to sustain the request. 19 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 784 (repealed). See also Commonwealth v. Gelormo, Pa. Super. -,
475 A.2d 765
(1984).
77. 427 Pa. 265, 275-76, 234 A.2d 540, 546-47 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968),
death penalty vacated, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, Commonwealth v.
Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976).
78. 427 Pa. at 275-76, 234 A.2d at 546-47. After reviewing the limited purpose for
which the investigator's assistance was sought, the supreme court found neither a constitutional violation nor an abuse of discretion. Id. Phelan then raised this identical issue in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was also denied. Phelan v. Brierley, 453 F.2d 73
(1971), afj'g 312 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also Comment, The Indigent Criminal
Defendant and Defense Services: A Search for ConstitutionalStandards, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
647, 651-52 (1973) (most courts require a showing of particularized need).
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sought. 79 In contrast to the frequency of litigation in other states,
the denial of such assistance has not been raised as an issue in any
of the death penalty cases decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court 80 since the enabling legislation was repealed in 1978.81 As an
initial response to this revelation, one might assume that death
penalty defendants in Pennsylvania are liberally afforded adequate
assistance in addition to counsel, thus making it unnecessary to
raise the issue on appeal.8 2 A review of the Pennsylvania cases affirming sentences of death, however, suggests that there is no support for this assumption. 3
79.

See Commonwealth v. Gelormo,

-

Pa. Super.

-,

475 A.2d 765 (1984); Common-

wealth v. Rochester, 305 Pa. Super. 364, 451 A.2d 690 (1982). When 19 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 784 was repealed, it was replaced by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3722 (1982). See supra note 2.
Neither of these provisions provide any guidance to the trial court as to when assistance in
addition to counsel is required. Id. Legislation in support of defense services may also be
found in the Public Defender Act, 16 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9960.1-6 (Purdon Supp. 1984),
or within the statutory authorization for the appointment of counsel and reimbursement for
necessary expenses. 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9960.7 (Purdon Supp. 1984). See Comment,
supra note 24, at 336.
80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(h) (1982) provides in pertinent part that "[a] sentence of
death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant
to its rules." Id.
81. As of this writing, the following death penalty cases had been reviewed and affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Commonwealth v. Szuchon, - Pa. -, 484
A.2d 1365 (1984); Commonwealth v. Beasley, - Pa. __, 479 A.2d 460 (1984); Commonwealth v. Maxwell,

-

Pa.

-,

477 A.2d 1309, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 370 (1984); Common-

wealth v. Beasley, - Pa. .. , 475 A.2d 730 (1984); Commonwealth v. Stoyko, - Pa. -,
475 A.2d 714, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 361 (1984); Commonwealth v. Frey, - Pa. -., 475
A.2d 700, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 360 (1984); Commonwealth v. Lesko, 502 Pa. 511, 467 A.2d
307 (1984), Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3547 (1984); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 2444 (1983).
82. It is not possible in all cases to determine what evidence in mitigation was
presented to the jury. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. at 78, 454 A.2d at
969 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The parties agreed that at least one mitigating circumstance
was present in this case: that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal
convictions."). See also Commonwealth v. Frey,

-

Pa.

-,

475 A.2d 700, cert. denied, 105

S. Ct. 360 (1984).
83. This is not to suggest that the issue has been properly raised in cases where the
death penalty was vacated and a new trial granted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clayton, No.
J-63-84, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1984), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded for a new trial because evidence of another murder had been improperly admitted.
Clayton had filed a motion to dismiss based on the passage of time between the murder and
his arrest. Slip op. at 3. One of the issues raised on appeal included Clayton's inability to
locate witnesses who were necessary to prepare an adequate defense. Id. Clayton had requested that the prosecutor provide information about one specific witness because he had
insufficient funds to hire an investigator to locate the man. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's action because new grounds for the motion were being alleged for the first time in this appeal and because Clayton did not prove that the potential
witness was a material witness lost to the defense because of the delay. Id. The latter expla-
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In Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 4 for example, Justice Hutchinson,
in a dissenting opinion, made it very clear that trial counsel
neither requested the appointment of an expert nor presented one
at trial for sentencing." As Justice Hutchinson explained, "the
jury was left only with defense counsel's bald statement concerning
the existence of mitigating circumstances."86 The issue was also
not raised on appeal because court-appointed appellate counsel admittedly raised only those ineffectiveness issues which were either
pointed out to him by the appellant himself or which were raised
by trial counsel in post-trial motions.87 Appellate counsel also admitted at oral argument that he had not read any of the United
States Supreme Court death penalty cases; thus, even his awareness of this issue may be questioned. 8
In Commonwealth v. Beasley"9 two of the issues raised on appeal
concerned the presentation of mitigating circumstances." First, defense counsel argued that the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutionally restricts the mitigating circumstances that a jury may consider; and, secondly, that the statute unconstitutionally places the
burden of proving mitigating circumstances on the defendant."'
Yet, the sole witness offered at the penalty phase of the trial was
the appellant's mother."2 No evidence was presented nor was argunation given by the court sounds very much like the North Carolina requirement that a
criminal defendant first prove what the investigator would have found before the need for
such services can be established. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
The lack of and need for funds to hire an investigator were not raised, of course, either at
trial or on appeal. See slip op. at 10 for the other issues that were raised by the appellant.
84. Pa. -,
475 A.2d 714, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 361 (1984).
85. Id. at 726 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Trial counsel also admitted that he had never tried a homicide case, suggesting
that he would not otherwise be aware of the need for experts or investigators from his own
prior experience. The majority opinion dealt only with trial counsel's ineffectiveness in relation to his treatment of the statutory aggravating circumstance. Id. at 721-24. Justice Nix,
writing separately in dissent, would have remanded the case for the appointment of new
appellate counsel to effectively raise and argue the sentencing issues. Id. at 725 (Nix, J.,
dissenting).
89. __ Pa. __, 475 A.2d 730 (1984).
90. Id. at 737.
91. Id. at 739. Beasley was basing his first argument on the trial court's having sustained a Commonwealth objection when counsel questioned the appellant's mother about
the effects of Beasley's drinking and subsequent blackouts. Id. Because the question was
directed at Beasley's condition twelve years earlier, the supreme court found no restriction
on evidence in mitigation relevant to the present case. Id.
92. The Commonwealth had argued that the question was proper only if it were asked
of a medical expert. Id.
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ment made on appeal that the defendant had been precluded from
securing additional witnesses or expert testimony either because of
his inability to properly investigate other factors in mitigation or
because he had insufficient funds to obtain expert witnesses.9 3
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 4 defense counsel failed
to present any evidence in mitigation and trial counsel's omission
was not raised as an issue on appeal."s This is particularly disturbing because under the current interpretation of Pennsylvania
law, a penalty of death is required once an aggravating circumstance is proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no mitigating circumstances are proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 This
absolute necessity for substantiating factors in mitigation"7 in a
93. Id. Mrs. Beasley testified that her son had received treatment in a psychiatric hospital at some unspecified time in the past, but no medical personnel presented evidence of a
psychiatric history. Id. Following this trial, Beasley was convicted and sentenced to death
for another homicide he had committed three months earlier. Commonwealth v. Beasley, Pa. -,
479 A.2d 460 (1984).
The court gave no indication in its review of this case whether trial counsel introduced
evidence in mitigation or was precluded from doing so. As in Beasley I, the jury found no
mitigating circumstances; hence, under the Pennsylvania statute, the jury was required to
bring in a verdict of death. 479 A.2d at 464. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1982)
("the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance .
). See
also Beasley 1, 475 A.2d at 738.
94. Pa. __, 477 A.2d 1309, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 370 (1984).
95. 477 A.2d at 1317-18. See also Commonwealth v. Frey, Pa. -,
475 A.2d 700,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 360 (1984) (no indication that evidence in mitigation was presented
to the jury). Compare Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984) with Commonwealth v. Lesko, 502 Pa. 511, 467 A.2d 307
(1983), where it is apparent that at least one mitigating circumstance was found by the jury,
thereby permitting it to "weigh" aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Travaglia, 502
Pa. at 509, 467 A.2d at 306 (Nix, J., concurring). See PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9711(c)(iv) (1982).
Chief Justice Roberts, in a dissenting opinion, pointed out that Lesko and Travaglia were
represented at trial, sentencing, and on appeal by the same counsel, precluding any meaningful inquiry into the effectiveness of his representation. 502 Pa. at 510, 467 A.2d at 307
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
96. See supra note 93. Under the 1974 statute, the existence of one or more mitigating
circumstances was an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty. See Commonwealth v. Crenshaw, Pa. __, 470 A.2d 451 (1983) (death sentence for murder committed
prior to the 1978 reenactment of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute vacated).
97. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e) identifies mitigating circumstances as follows:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.
(3) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(4) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S. 309 (relating to duress), or acted
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death penalty case demonstrates the concomitant need for attorneys to secure assistance in addition to the legal expertise they can
provide. In conducting proportionality review,9" the Maxwell court
pointed out that the sentence of death has always been imposed in
Pennsylvania where a defendant does not present any mitigating
circumstances and the Commonwealth proves at least one aggravating circumstance.9 9 This is hardly surprising since the jury is
instructed that it is their duty, under the law, to bring back a sentence of death in such circumstances.1 0 0
The most bizarre case, however, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has affirmed a sentence of death is, undoubtedly,
Commonwealth v. Szuchon.1° ' In that case, Joseph Szuchon was
defended by two attorneys who had been appointed by the court to
represent him in a death penalty case just one week prior to
trial.1 02 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to recognize
counsel's
ineffectiveness"'
on to
thewaive
grounds
that Szuchon's
cooperativeness
and his refusal
his constitutional
rightunto

under the substantial domination of another person.
(6) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented
to the homicidal acts.
(7) The defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(8) Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.
Id.
98. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (1982) requires the supreme court to determine
whether "the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases" before it may affirm the sentence of death. Id.
99. 477 A.2d at 1318.
100. See supra notes 93 & 96 and accompanying text. This point of law appears to
have escaped detection by the court since, after stating that the death sentence has always
been imposed in the absence of proof of mitigating circumstances, it attributes more importance to the fact that in cases like Maxwell, where identical aggravating circumstances were
found and no mitigating circumstances, "all defendants received the death penalty." 477
A.2d at 1318.
101. - Pa. -, 484 A.2d 1365 (1984).
102. Id. at 1374. Szuchon initially retained private counsel, who had entered an appearance on April 16, 1981, but when the defendant refused to waive his right to a speedy
trial during a colloquy held on September 24, 1981, the relationship between Szuchon and
counsel broke down irretrievably and private counsel was allowed to withdraw from the
case. Id. at 1371-72. Between September 24th and October 9th, 1981, Szuchon kept insisting
that he would hire another attorney and refused the assistance of the attorneys who had
been appointed by the court on October 5th, 1981. Id.
103. Id. at 1377-81. On appeal, trial counsel's ineffectiveness was argued on two
grounds: (1) that counsel was ineffective per se due to the lack of time available for preparation; and (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to object when jurors were improperly
stricken for cause. Id. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (the state may only
exclude jurors in capital cases who are unalterably opposed to the death penalty). 484 A.2d
at 1377-80. See also infra note 105.
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a speedy trial1 'O were the cause of counsel's lack of preparation.1 08
Szuchon was held personally accountable, without regard to the
fact that private counsel, whom he had retained more than five
months earlier, had not filed one pre-trial motion, other than a notice of insanity defense, had not completed discovery, and had
failed to arrange a psychiatric examination.1 06 Despite the impending final trial date, defense counsel had not requested additional
funds or the appointment of co-counsel to enable him to prepare
Mr. Szuchon's defense. 0 7 Although Szuchon admittedly displayed
104. It is questionable whether a waiver was required under the facts in this case. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Manley, Pa. __, 469 A.2d 1042 (1983) (where defendant appeared for trial without counsel but did not waive his right to counsel, period of delay between that trial date and public defender's entering appearance is excludable from computation of time for commencing trial under Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure and is attributable to defendant's unavailability); Commonwealth v. Millhouse,
470 Pa. 512, 368 A.2d 1273 (1977) (defendant who had not waived his right to counsel and
who, although financially capable of retaining counsel, appeared uncounseled, was unavailable for trial within meaning of Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure).
105. 484 A.2d at 1375-76. Justice Larsen, author of the majority opinion, stated that
"[jiust as a criminal defendant may knowingly and intelligently choose to waive his right to
be represented by counsel, so too may a defendant knowingly and intelligently choose to
proceed to trial represented by counsel who has had little or no time for preparation." Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Nix pointed out that lack of preparation time is irrelevant
to trial counsel's legal ability to respond to prosecutorial challenges for cause. Id. at 1382

(Nix, C.J., dissenting).
Szuchon's defense to the murder of his estranged girlfriend was that of diminished capacity and/or intoxication. Evidence of this defense was presented through the testimony of the
defendant, and was described by the Szuchon court as "vague and equivocal." Id. The Commonwealth rebutted this evidence with testimony by a psychiatrist who had examined
Szuchon at Warren State Hospital, as well as testimony from two eyewitnesses, police officers and others. Id. No evidence was presented at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 1370. The
defense merely argued the existence of four mitigating circumstances. Id. See supra note 86
and accompanying text.
The court did not explain the circumstances under which Szuchon was examined by the
Commonwealth's expert. Szuchon apparently discussed his participation in the crime with
the psychiatrist, but there is no indication that Szuchon was warned prior to the examination that the statements elicited from him would later be used against him at trial. See
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (defendant must be advised of fifth amendment privilege if disclosures made during psychiatric examination are to be introduced at guilt or sentencing phase of trial). On October 6, 1981 the court appointed another psychiatrist to examine Szuchon, presumably to assist with his insanity defense, but Szuchon refused to
submit to the evaluation. 484 A.2d at 1374.
106. 484 A.2d at 1372-73. During the October 6th colloquy, Szuchon was berated by
the trial judge for refusing to cooperate and for not having prepared his defense. Id. Neither
the trial court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discuss earlier counsel's failure to adequately represent Szuchon's interests.
107. Cf. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 341 (1982). In
Wood the defendant refused to cooperate with the psychiatrist appointed prior to trial to
assist in his defense, because Wood believed that his attorney's theory of a defense was
inconsistent with his own. Id. at 86. A second motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist
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recalcitrance just prior to the final trial date by refusing to co-operate and/or waive his right to a speedy trial, it is difficult to see
the propriety of sanctioning the defendant without evidence that
Szuchon was also responsible for counsel's omissions up to that
point in time. Yet, the Szuchon court concluded that the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to effective
10 8
representation of counsel.
The difference among the states in providing for adequate representation of its capital defendants is most blatently apparent in
Szuchon. For any attorney to have participated in the defense of a
capital crime without preparation or assistance of other experts
casts a pall over the entire criminal justice system. Although the
availability of support services may not have helped Szuchon, the
transgressions of defense counsel would have been more glaringly
apparent. The state's interest in a fair and accurate adjudication of
criminal cases was clearly de minimus during review of this case.
III.

CONCLUSION

The proliferation of defense motions for public monies to obtain
experts and/or investigators is evidence of the need for assistance
in addition to counsel in capital cases. The granting of such funds,
whether it be by the legislature or the judiciary, is evidence of at
least a limited recognition of the right to this assistance. Whether
this right is guaranteed by the United States Constitution remains
unclear.'
This specific issue has not been addressed by the
United States Supreme Court. 1 0 It may be argued, however, that
was filed prior to sentencing. Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found the court's
denial to be an abuse of discretion because it denied the defendant the right in a capital
case to present evidence in mitigation. Id.
108. Id. at 19 and 30, See supra note 105.
109. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
110. Resolving a closely related matter, the Supreme Court has decided Ake v.
Oklahoma, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla Crim. App.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984), rev'd, 53
U.S.L.W. 4179 (U.S. February 26, 1985) (No. 83-5424). In Ake the trial court had refused to
provide the services of a court-appointed psychiatrist and investigator to assist in the defense of a capital defendant. 663 P.2d at 6. In affirming the trial court's denial of the defense motion, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found the issue to have been waived
because it was not preserved in post-trial motions, but also included within its rationale the
fact that Oklahoma does not assume the responsibility for providing such services to indigent defendants. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
[Wihen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the
offense is to be a significant fact at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.
53 U.S.L.W. at 4183.
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such a right does exist, grounded in either the equal protection or
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment,1" ' the sixth
amendment guarantee of compulsory process and right to confront
witnesses," 2 the right to effective representation of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment," 3 and, particularly in death penalty
cases-the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.""
Recently, in Strickland v. Washington,"6 the United States Supreme Court did not find counsel ineffective for failing to request
funds for the services of an investigator or psychiatrist." The
Court's holding, however, was clearly premised upon a finding that
counsel's conduct was the result of reasonable trial strategy" 7 and,
secondly, upon an insufficient showing of prejudice by the defendant." 8 Whether the Court will decide the issue differently, if
counsel substantiates his own ineffectiveness in terms of trial preparation and presentation, remains to be seen. It is clear, however,
that counsel must protect his client's interests at the pre-trial stage
by requesting necessary assistance in accordance with state procedural requirements, by presenting sufficient evidence of need and
actual prejudice if the assistance is denied, and by raising all of the
111. See, e.g., Roberts v. Lavalee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) ("differences in access to the
instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based on the financial situation of the
defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution"). See also Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 609
(1974) (" 'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably
indistinguishable.").
112. See, e.g., Chambers v., Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("Few rights are
more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.").
113. See, e.g., Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 936 (1975) ("the effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause
requires, when necessary, the allowance of investigative expenses or appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their
defense by their attorneys.").
114. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) ("A jury must be allowed to
consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.").
This is not to suggest that state constitutions should be ignored as an independent source
in the search for constitutional grounds for necessary defense services.
115. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
116. Id. at 2071. "Trial counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with
respondent that character and psychological evidence would be of little help." Id.
117. "On these facts, there can be little question, even without application of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial counsel's defense, though unsuccessful was the
result of reasonable professional judgment." Id.
118. Id. "Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim." Id.
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possible statutory and constitutional bases establishing or supporting a right to this assistance.
Despite all efforts made by defense counsel, a jury, of course,
may impose a sentence of death. Unjustified impositions of such
sentences may very well be avoided, however, if a constitutional
right to assistance in addition to counsel is recognized. Regardless
of whether such a right is established, and regardless of whether
the courts regard counsel's representation as inadequate, an attorney who fails to make every effort to save his client's life must deal
with his own conscience, with knowledge of the price that someone
else has paid for his dereliction of duty.
Judith Olmstead

